reading of historical and modern sources, this paper argues that it was not solely the 2 This coverage of the revolution and its immediate aftermath perhaps better reflect hurt sensibilities regarding the deposing of the US-backed shah, rather than the complexities of the regional situation.
Yet revisionism on this issue should be prompted, not simply by the topic of this collection, which asks, among other things, how historical events and transnational dynamics have shaped communal and ideological struggles within the Gulf, but also in consideration of contemporary facts. Following extensive scrutiny of the recent unrest by academics, NGOs, human rights organizations and social and traditional media, the Bahraini government's rhetoric about the Iranian sponsorship of the 2011 Uprising has been thrown into serious doubt. It is generally accepted that despite the Government of Bahrain's attempts to claim Iranian involvement behind the pro-democracy movement of 2011 3 , no substantive evidence has been found. 4 On the contrary, analyses have
shown that the government of Bahrain has employed PR companies to deliberately exaggerate the claim of Iranian involvement. 5 Indeed, with the Government of Bahrain known to have deliberately instrumentalised sectarian relations as a divide and rule strategy in the recent Uprising 6 , the discrediting of attempts to invoke Iranian-backing should prompt a re-evaluation of an often uncritically embraced assumption of Iranian agency in Bahraini politics throughout the early 1980s. Could it be that that the 1979
Revolution as-a-turning-point discourse is also a specious foundation on which current denouncements of the opposition lie? Has the emphasis in both media discourse and history itself come to represent an inaccurate and exaggerated distal shift in Bahrain's history? By reviewing the historical record, I argue that there were other significant, but poorly understood, factors during the 1970s and 1980s that resulted in both the increasing oppression of the 'religious' and non-religious opposition. Furthermore, the weight given to the Islamic Revolution in Bahrain outweighs its significance as the proximate cause in altering the modalities of repression and the treatment of Shi'a in Bahrain. Placing the cart before the horse is both inaccurate and damaging. Not only does it misplace causality for ideological reasons, but it has averted attention from exploring other important factors, such as a fundamentally discriminatory political system.
Metanarrative of the Revolution as turning-point discourse
The Iranian Revolution as a turning point in Bahraini politics narratives tend to abrogate local agency or more complex explanations in favour of a simplified Iran-as-abogeyman analysis. As a result, it has become a recurring theme within national security rhetoric in Bahrain aimed at legitimising the persecution of the country's Shiʿa population by emphasising their disputed allegiance to Bahrain. It has also served to support the hegemonic status quo by reinforcing the notion that the Government's oppression of the opposition is done so in order to maintain stability, plurality and sovereignty in the wake of an enduring transnational theocratic threat. 7 Over emphasising the importance of the Islamic Revolution in Bahrain's history therefore underpins government strategies, processes, and actions that serve to disproportionally criminalise or 'securitise' (to use the fashionable nomenclature) the Shi'a members of society, while obscuring the roots of this discrimination. This, in turn, assists in the attribution of 'inferiority and/or radical alienness' of the Shi'a as Other, or outgroup, 8 thereby perpetuating cycles of discrimination. Not only is this 'othering' regionally embedded, but it is also undoubtedly aggravated by Western hostility towards Iran which, as Shireen Hunter argues, has played a major role in causing people to overlook atrocities and injustices committed against Shi'a populations across the globe. 9 To be clear, there is a difference between arguments of the impact of the Iranian Revolution in Bahrain, and the manner in which the Revolution was instrumentalised as a strategy of control. Indeed, it is certainly true that Bahrain's Rulers have invoked the Revolution 'to win the reflexive support of ordinary Sunnis and to diffuse citizen pressure for a political opening'. 10 This argument, however, is different from overstating the actual effects on the beliefs of Bahrainis.
The turning-point narrative is pervasive in academic, policy, media and legal literature on Bahrain. In general, the perception of the post-1979 Iranian Government as a rogue actor in the international system, along with its well-publicised desire to 'export' the revolution, has facilitated the analysis of it as a causal fulcrum and archvillain in regional politics. This perception has been augmented since the invasion of 
Revisiting the Revolution
In many cases, it has become a truism that the unrest and demonstrations that occurred 31 . Walker noted that the revolution had given the Shia a 'psychological boost', and encouraged some to press a list for twelve demands, that included asking for some form of Islamic governance, to saying music should not be taught in schools. The government's response was to allow the Shi'a to 'blow off steam', and a number of demonstrations were held in August 1979. 32 Ultimately though, these demands were not dissimilar from those advocated by the Shia bloc during Bahrain's short-lived National
Assembly from 1973-75.
Yet there is also evidence to suggest it was the Bahraini government's response Khoki. 36 Indeed, it was only after 1975 that death by torture in Bahrain's prisons, which had not been reported between the 1920s and the 1970s, became more prevalent.
Between 1976 and 1986, eight people died in police custody, and Amnesty International and the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group reported that at least six of those were believed to be because of torture. 37 In this regard, the rise in police brutality, the reasons for which shall be discussed later, was also an important factor in local
demonstrations, yet these are rarely elaborated upon.
Transnational narratives versus longstanding discrimination
In addition to exaggerating the impact of the Revolution's appeal, the salience of the Iranian Revolution as a turning-point discourse is problematic as it positions the Shi'a as a security threat, implying that they are somehow agents of their own persecution.
This totalizing narrative reflects the contemporary politicisation of Shia/Sunni sectarian relations, and detracts the focus from a fundamentally oppressive political system that has been documented since, at least, the Al Khalifa conquest of the Bahrain islands.
Because of the often ill-defined nature of the term 'sectarianism', there has been a tendency to parse it off from other explanatory variables, resulting in a sui generis approach that ignores fundamental aspects of intersecting discrimination, culture and social conditions 38 . McVeigh argues that sectarianism has been undertheorised and actually constitutes a form of racism. 39 Fanar Haddad echoes this sentiment, noting that academic theorising of race relations is fare more nuanced than the often crude application of 'sectarianism'. 4041 In the case of Bahrain, ethno-religious discrimination of a former serf/slave population, one in which specific members of the Shi'i community can still also achieve positions of high office, has taken on the rigidity of institutional discrimination. It is important to question to what extent this ethnoreligious discrimination and tribal-familial exclusivity among the ruling elite informs state violence, and how long it has lasted, in order to better counter the 'turning-point' discourse. Indeed, the historical record suggests that it was in times of increasing persecution in Bahrain that inhabitants sought protection, rather than passively adopting exogenous beliefs based on ideology alone. In 1921, Major Clive Daly, the British Political Agent in Bahrain, stated that he was often asked, 'Why do you not remove
British protection then we would at least have the redress usually resorted to by Arabs.
We should appeal to another Arab ruler to take over our country and treat us better'. 42 Narratives that reflect a transnational determinism, that is, a tendency to portray major variables as emanating from external sources, can often be rooted in the political ideology of a multitude of prisms, from neo-imperialism itself, to postcolonial discourses and Arab Nationalism. The most obvious example is the aforementioned transatlantic antipathy towards Iran, a result of the humiliation faced by Britain and the US following the ejecting of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the overthrow of the Shah respectively. Yet part of the problem in studying Bahrain, perhaps, also lies in the application of what has become a Eurocentric phenomenon of modernity to analysisone, in which the creation of the state and its institutions through colonialism is somehow the subject of focus, and one that can result in total disjuncture between a previous era and the 'modern'. 43 In this analysis, concepts such as sectarianism somehow become a neatly packaged and temporally limited product of modernity. For example, it is contentious to argue that "the 'vertical segmentation' in Bahraini politics
was not an age-old form of political mobilization, but a modernist one whose roots were sculpted during the period of British divided and contested rule in 1900-1923, and in the colonial ethnosectarian gaze that accompanied it". 44 This argument places the roots of sectarian tensions at the British administration, reflecting underlying tones of Arab Nationalism, whose central tenets rallied against imperialism. Certainly, postOrientalist analysis and post-colonial critique have used it to buttress the anti-imperial tenets of Arab Nationalism which sought to define sectarian antipathy not only as deviant, but also as a colonial construct 45 . While there is clearly truth in this, it does not make it wholly accurate, and such arguments run the risk of creating the illusion of a pre-imperial utopia.
Despite the analytical richness of such writings, it leads to arguments that again, seek to explain phenomena such as sectarian tensions as being primarily or solely the work of external agency, beginning at a specific point. This results in the problem of potentially attributing subaltern victimhood to those who may be active agents in a discriminatory apparatus. Such arguments run the risk of ignoring the colonising agency or prejudices of local actors, or undermining the significance of local social, political or cultural contexts that are capable themselves of mobilization, discrimination, and prejudice. In recent years this has been abetted, for example, by King Abdullah of Jordan, whose discourse of a rising Shi'i Crescent has become a 'self-'fulfilling prophecy', reflecting not necessarily the threat by 'the Shi'a', but that the 'Arab world has identified the region's Shi'i communities as threats to their authority'. 46 While we should not be dismissive of any of these variables, there is a danger in Bahrain that they Although the wide scale abuses faced by the Baḥārna in the 1800s and early 1900s were not replicated[rp2] as they had been, communal strife enflamed periodically.
The British reluctance and even inability to tackle this discrimination was evident as late as the 1950s, when they were still attempting to cover up tribal oppression that provoked communal tensions. Arabian authoritarianism, which one official described as 'too Islamic' and 'too close for comfort' 79 . As early as 1972, the British noted that in many ways, the Saudis were more of a worry than Iran, due to their influence and conservatism. 80 Prior to
Resurgent modalities of repression and their causes: From independence to the Iranian Revolution
Independence, the prospect of having Bedouin in the security forces was shot down by the British administration, who were advising on the creation of the new army. Yet by 1982, the recruitment of 300 'kindred tribesmen' from Saudi into the security forces raised issues of whether they would impact upon institutional prejudice 81 . It appeared Saudi's influence was especially evident in the Prime Minister, who was reportedly unwilling to defy King Faisal 82 . So, in addition to the internal reversion back to Al Khalifa dominance in internal security policy, the previously dominant British-Al Khalifa dialectic that informed approaches to security was now being usurped to some extent by a 'conservative Sa'udi-Al Khalifa nexus' 83 . Yet while much discussion has focused on Iranian-subversion as a catalyst for changing threat perceptions, or Shi'a susceptibility to ideological control, little is made of Bahrain's actual alliance with Saudi Arabia. 'by a relative lack of inhibition or restraint on the use of power' 90 . It can hardly be said to be black and white, but one of degree, where 'lack of inhibition' in the use of power is highly dependent on the beliefs of those responsible for its deployment, as well as other contextual considerations. It would be difficult to argue that the increasing brutality of the police, which had its inception long before the Iranian Revolution, was not contributing to rising tensions, and indicative of not simply a shifting 'threat perception', but a differing authoritarian reflex, and a reciprocity between repression and dissent. Similarly, while Gause argues that countries like Bahrain had successfully staved off revolution by modernising, it would seem that a Shi'a insurrection did not occur despite repression, and that in many cases, policies were undertaken that could actually exacerbate hostility to the regime. Indeed, while the Prime Minister's actions occurred in the aftermath of the Revolution, they were not undertaken on the grounds that those arrested or deported were posing a clear security threat. They were taken with the warning that they would exacerbate any hostility towards the regime.
Dissolving the National Assembly
In addition to the role played by the security services, Bahrain's brief democratic experiment between 1973 and 1975 had also contributed to strengthening a unified opposition, reflecting a resurgence of what might be termed deliberately divisive politics 91 . Whereas the government had hoped that the so-called 'people's bloc' 92 and 'religious bloc' would always be at loggerheads, their joint opposition to the government-proposed Security Law created an alliance. 93 This unity had alarmed the regime and contributed to them dissolving parliament, for fear that legal unity of opposition could transcend the oppositional fragmentation that the Al Khalifa regime had used to keep the opposition divided and weak. For this reason, the government tried to drive a wedge between the leftists and religious elements, isolating them. As such, the period following 1975 was important, as it marked a 'reconfiguration of the Bahraini opposition landscape'. 94 Only a year after the creation of parliament, the British official Robert Tesh noted that the 'rulers are deliberately encouraging the Right (particularly the Religious group) to react against the Left' 95 . One minister insisted that the left were being successfully smeared as communists and were becoming generally unpopular. As occurred with the Shi'a being painted as an exogenous fifth column, the regime also 'deliberately exaggerated' the extent to which leftist groups were taking orders from outside the country. 96 Tesh noted that a '"divide and rule" policy does, however, have its dangers and creates the possibility of violence'.
97
The rift between the left and conservative elements was further driven home in 1976 with the high profile murder of Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Madani, a Shi'a religious scholar and editor of the local newspaper Al-Mawaqif. Maintained by many Bahrainis as a government conspiracy, his murder resulted in a further shift in the modalities of repression, and a different approach to interrogation and torture. 98 The murder, after which there was a summary political trial, was used by the Bahraini authorities to justify a crackdown on leftist political groups in Bahrain, and resulted in a policy that had previously prevented targets of subversion from being arrested, and therefore tortured.
As Given[rp6] noted, 'the 'murder removed the restriction on the interrogation of Popular
Front suspects, and enabled the police to acquire a clearer picture than before of its ramifications and activities'. 99 Prior to this, 'the absence of interrogation of suspects meant that the police received only the amount of intelligence which their sources in the NLF cared to give them'. 100 The policy seemed to immediately follow the death of two Bahrainis, Muhammad Ghulum Busheri and Saʿid al-ʿUwaynati, who were killed under torture following their arrest. Although the trial was highly politicised, and the evidence shaky, the ruling family used it as an opportunity to concentrate in their hands both politically sensitive posts and those relating to social affairs. 101 Saudi pressure was strongly evident in the trial, and they, along with the Prime Minister, were pushing strongly for death penalties, which were successfully carried out in 1977 102 . With the wholescale crackdown on the leftist movement, and their perceived role as being involved in anti-Shi'a attacks, it was much easier for an Islamist opposition to appear dominant. In this regard, the threat of popular politics in infringing on increasingly 105 . It would be logically problematic to argue that the leftist opposition were simply usurped by the popularity of Iranian-trained clerics who only after the Revolution used the pulpit to put forward progressive issues such as constitutional reform and human rights 106 .
Actual and anticipated economic fallout.
In addition to shifting changes in the authority structures in Bahrain, and a less tolerant approach towards opposition, economic factors were among those contributing to unrest in the country. While Gause argues that the failure of the Iranian Revolution to trigger an uprising in Bahrain rested on the capacity of the state to provide services for citizens may be somewhat economically deterministic, Frederic Wherey adds that on the eve of the Revolution across the Gulf, the 'Shiʿa were faced with a combustible blend of rising expectations, poor living conditions, and limited avenues for political participation'. 107 Add to this rising corruption and cronyism, which was actually becoming an increasingly large problem. 
Conclusion
Numerous scholars have argued that the Iranian Revolution was a major distal shift in So while the resonance of the Iranian Revolution is important, emphasising it as the causal agent in the rise of sectarian hostility validates the structures of power that perpetuate an existing conquerer-subject relationship in Bahrain, drawing on notions of prejudice in which Shi'a are seen as innately revolutionary and deviant. Indeed, the combination of the rhetoric of the Shi'a as an underclass in Bahrain, coupled with their historic discrimination, raises the issue of whether or not it is logically defensible to focus on the Iranian Revolution as a motivator of unrest. While is understandable that the Revolution [rp13]has attracted much attention, as it revised the US and European foreign policy to Iran, this transnationally deterministic paradigm has facilitated uncritical analyses seen through the prism of Atlantic-centric security concerns. 
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